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Sanctioned irregularities : martial law in Billy Budd, Sailor
Abstract
For the American legal historian Robert Cover, the writing of Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process was a political as well as a scholarly project. This study of nineteenth-century American judges
who, despite their own opposition to slavery, ordered the return of escaped slaves in accordance with the
Fugitive Slaves Act, provided an analogue for a contemporary conflict between law and conscience, the
enforcement of compulsory military service in Vietnam. In his Prelude to Justice Accused, Cover offered a
literary exemplum of this conflict: the story of Captain Vere in Melville's Billy Budd. He also proposed one
of his "accused" judges, Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of Massachusetts and Melville's father-in-law, as a
possible model for Vere. Since then, a number of legal-historical readings of Billy Budd, connecting
Melville's narrative with the judicial practices of Shaw or his age, have been made. In this paper I review
this line of interpretation, and then seek to develop it by focusing on shifts in the discourse of martial law.
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SANCTIONED
IRREGULARITIES:
MARTIAL LAW IN BILL Y
BUDD.. SAILOR
Kieran Dolin

or the American legal historian Robert Cover, the writing of Justice
Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process was a political as well as
a scholarly project. This study of nineteenth-century American judges
who, despite their own opposition to slavery, ordered the return of escaped
slaves in accordance with the Fugitive Slaves Act, provided an analogue for
a contemporary conflict between law and conscience, the enforcement of
compulsory military service in Vietnam. In his Prelude to Justice Accused,
Cover offered a literary exemplum of this conflict: the story of Captain Vere
in Melville's Billy Budd. He also proposed one of his "accused" judges,
Lemuel Shaw, ChiefJustice of Massachusetts and Melville's father-in-law, as
a possible model for Vere. Since then, a number of legal-historical readings
of Billy Budd, connecting Melville's narrative with the judicial practices of
Shaw or his age, have been~made. In this paper I review this line of interpretation, and then seek to develop it by focusing on shifts in the discourse
of martial law.
The plot of Billy Budd has been well summarized by Robert A. Ferguson.
Shortly after being press-ganged from his ship, the "Rights of Man", to a
man-of-war, the "Bellipotent", "Billy Budd, innocence personified, kills the
ship's master-at-arms, John Claggart, with a single impulsive blow when
Claggart falsely accuses him of mutiny before their captain, Edward Fairfax
Vere. Billy strikes because a stutter prevents him from speaking; he is then
charged, tried, sentenced and hanged by Captain Vere and a drumhead court
for the capital offence of hitting a superior."1 The crux of the trial is the following passage in which Vere favours the letter of the law over what he calls
"natural justice":
'How can we adjudge to summary and shameful death a fellow creature innocent before God, and whom we feel to be so?
... Welll too feel that, the full force of that. It is Nature. But
do these buttons that we wear attest that our allegiance is to
Nature? No, to the King. ... [In] receiving our commissions we
in the most important regards ceased to be natural free agents.
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... [S]uppose condemnation to follow the present proceedings.
Would it be so much we ourselves that would condemn as it
would the martial law operating through us? For that law, and
the rigour oj it, we are not responsible. Our vowed responsibility is in this: that however pitilessly that law may operate in
any instances, we nevertheless adhere to it and administer it.'2
Cover argues that Vere's words represent a "positivist's condensation of a
legal system's formal character", and discerns five aspects ofthat fonnalism:
(1) an explicit recognition of the role character of the judges; (2) the source
of law's obligation is neither nature nor conscience; (3) the law is readily
identifiable in an imperial code, which governs situations of the type under
consideration; (4) the will behind the law is uncertain, but clearly not that of
the judges; (5) the judge is not responsible for the content, but only for the
application ofthe law.3 Ferguson adopts Cover's reading, and sees in Captain
Vere's canvassing and rejecting of the claims of "Nature" a recapitulation of
the transition from Natural Law to Legal Positivism as the dominant legal
theory in America during the nineteenth century. Brook Thomas offers a new
historicist reading of Melville's novellas, and Shaw's judgments.4 He links
Captain Vere with Shaw's judicial conduct in the Webster murder case. The
latter was a controversial trial in which Shaw's direction to the jury was censured for its general pattiality in favour of the prosecution. Of specific concern was a departure from precedent in which he ruled that only the fact of
murder need be established beyond reasonable doubt, and that the involvement ofthe accused need only be proved to the jury's reasonable satisfaction.
Thomas connects this willingness to change the law to meet present needs
with Vere's manipulation of the drumhead court. Vere most impresses the
court by "his closing appeal to their instinct as sea officers" which canvasses the practical consequences of apparent leniency in Uthe year of mutinies"
(p.390); he acts in effect as witness, prosecutor and judge during the trial;
and he thereby ensures that the court's order reproduces his own initial "prejudgment" ofthe case ("'Yet the angel must hang'" [p.378J). Thomas's analysis of the trial scene therefore emphasizes not the triumph of formalism and
positivism (which, with some qualifications as to dates, he accepts), but the
way in which fo~alism serves as a mask, covering the mutation of fonns for
political purposes.
Before concluding the trial narrative with the fonnal conviction and sentence, the narrator digresses to compare the ~~harassed frame of mind" of
Billy's judges with that of the Conunander of the USS Somers, who in 1842
executed three men for conspiring to mutiny (p.390). Melville's brother-inlaw, Guen Gansevoort, was an officer on the Somers and a member of the
dmmhead court on that occasion. As many critics have noted, the Somers
case was "reopened" by journalists during the late 1880's when Melville was
working on Billy Budd, and it is a major source of the novel's legal action. s
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The narrator avoids expressing an opinion on the case: "History, and here
cited without comment"; but compares the subjective perceptions ofthe two
courts in such a way as to leave open the question of over-reaction: "But the
urgency felt, whether well-warranted or otherwise, was much the same"
(p.391).
The Somers case became a cause celebre, not least because one of those
executed, Philip Spencer, was the son of a cabinet minister. The issues were
therefore openly debated in judicial, political and cultural forums, in contrast
to the abbreviated and misleading "considerate" notice of Billy's hanging.
Thomas argues that this silence, together with Billy's defective speech, functions as a political metaphor for the powerlessness of the seamen who are
unable to protest against their own oppression. A crucial scene for Thomas
is the disciplinary flogging which Billy witnesses the day after his impressment. He resolves that "never through remissness would he make himself
liable to such a visitation" (p.346). Thomas suggests that Billy is rendered
easily controllable by "the accepted forms and usages of the navy", and that
his silence in the face of this law signifies a general inability to resist this
unjust regime. 6 The stutter, therefore, is a "flaw" in moral and political
terms, signifying a fatal willingness to let others, especially Vere. speak on
his behalf. In retelling the story of Billy Budd as victim, Melville challenges
Vere's law by means of what Thomas calls "subversive indirection".7 This
is a complex and subtle argument, which takes account of the narrative form
as well as the legal content of Billy Budd. Thomas's phrase, "the accepted
forms and usages of the navy", covers two kinds, two sources oflaw, however: the formal prescriptions of a statute ("forms"), and the unwritten customs,
the traditional practices. ~of naval punishment ("usages"). For the flogging
scene differs from Billy's trial through its radical substitution of language
with force. Although the "cat-o'-nine-tails" was prescribed for summary
punishment under the Articles of War, it was not so much a modem formalist system of discipline as a customary spectacle of overwhelming monarchical power imposed on the bodies of recaltritant sailors. Foucault, on
whose distinction I am relying here~ also draws attention to the relationship
between military orders and the emergence of disciplinary modes of control:
"While jurists or philosophers were seeking in the [social contract] a primal
model for the construction or reconstruction of the social body, the soldiers
and with them the teclmicians of discipline were elaborating procedures for
the individual and colJective coercion of bodies."8 In Billy Budd the dual
inscription of legalism and the lash, the mutual dependence of law and violence, takes place under the rule of martial law. To comprehend and represent this mutuality, I shall argue, Melville employs various structures of
exchange in his plot and narration.
The legal-historical reviews of Billy's trial reveal so many departures
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from the requirements ofthe Articles of War that Vere'sjustice is accused of
being a mask for illegal force. Richard H. Weisberg finds a series of significant errors, including: (1) only squadron or fleet commanders, not individual
ship commanders like Vere were commissioned to conduct courts-martial;
(2) a capital offence could not be tried or sentenced without the complaint
being referred to the Admiral; (3) at least five judges were required to constitute a court: (4) summary trial was only allowable for trivial offences; (5)
Vere acts as sole witness and prosecutor, and has a commanding influence
over the court; (6) a capital sentence could not be executed without reference
to the Admiral; (7) while hanging is the sole penalty prescribed for Billy's
crime, leniency was usually offered and a lesser punishment imposed; and
(8) courts-martial were required to be held in the most open part of the ship,
and not in secret. 9 Doubts about the regularity of Vere's proceedings and
about his rationality are focussed through the surgeon, who wonders, "Was
he unhinged?" (p.3 79).
Weisberg and C.B. Ives pursue this explanation of his misuses of law. 10
These readings properly particularize the character of Vere and the circumstances of this case, but they do not provide a sufficient explanation for the
historical data which they present. For example, they demonstrate that independently of what the Articles of War prescribed, naval conunanders customarily exercised a wide disciplinary discretion, that the maximum summary penalty of twelve .lashes was ~sual1y exceeded, and that the mandatory
sentence of death for striking an officer was by no means always imposed.
Ives explains this widespread latitude by reference to naval custom, which
viewed sceptically the attempts by politicians and the Admiralty to regulate
life at sea. Consequently, "a captain of a man-of-war was godlike and might
exercise his disciplinary discretion, or even his disciplinary whims freely
with little expectation of reproof."11
Vere's departure from the letter of the law may be seen, then, as a sign of
naval usage, of professional habits of thought and action. Melville's record
of his own "man.of-war experiences and observations" aboard an American
frigate during 1843-4, White-Jacket, speaks ofthe "notorious lawlessness" of
Commanders in tenns of a sailors' proverb, "the law was not made for the
Captain".12 The experiences of witnessing a flogging and of hearing the
monthly publib reading of the Articles of War lead to passionate, but wellinfonned, protests against the Articles as a legal regime. The burden of
White-Jacket's argument is that this law is adapted from the British statute of
the same name, and consequently that its provisions are inconsistent with the
fundamental tenets of American democracy. For example, by preserving a
general disciplinary discretion in the Captain it vests the powers of legisla·
tor, judge, and executive in one person; by exempting officers from some of
its penal clauses it violates the principle of equality before the law; and by
retaining flogging as the normal summary penalty it is comparable with ''the
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penal laws that prevailed in England some sixty years ago", in that it makes
no distinction between trivial and serious crimes. White-Jacket acknowledges that "the necessities of navies warrant a code for its government more
stringent than the law that governs the land; but that code should conform to
the spirit of the political institutions of the country that ordains it" (p.498).
The explanation of this "monstrous grafting oftyranny upon freedom" is historical: "they are an importation from abroad, even from Britain, whose laws
we Americans hurled off as tyrannical, yet retained the most tyrannical of
all" (p.662).
This robust rhetoric is supported by detailed citation from the Articles of
War and an informed discussion of constitutional and jurisprudential theories. Relevant historical examples and quotations from the best-known legal
writers, such as Justinian, Coke, Hale and Blackstone, produce one of the
most articulate evocations of legal culture in nineteenth-century hterature.
With confidence, indeed normative fervour, he declares, "it is for America to
make precedents, and not to obey them. ... And we Americans are ... the
Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties ofthe world" (p.506). The
reformism of White-Jacket is animated by an idealistic zeal to fulfil the
promise of the Declaration of Independence. It is derived from the same
Jeffersonian tradition that oversaw the incorporation ofthe Bill of Rights into
the American Constitution, the protections of which White-Jacket seeks to
extend to sailors. Melville finished work on Billy Budd in 1891, the centenary of incorporation of the Bill of Rights. By setting his novella in 1797,
he invokes an historical context in which liberty is curtailed by war, as signified by Billy's conscription from the Rights ofMan to the Bellipotent, and
in which the Old World is the negation of the New World defined by WhiteJacket. Indeed, one of!he latter's favourite contrasts, between American constitutionalism and the tyranny of the Russian czars, is implicitly repeated in
Billy Budd when the narrator compares the secrecy of the murder and trial
with "the policy adopted in those tragedies ofthe palace which have occurred
more than once in the capital founded by Peter the Barbarian" (p.381).
White-Jacket can only compare the "severity and unusualness" of the
Articles of War to the multiplication of mandatory death sentences in the
"Bloody Coden of England "some sixty years ago". During the monthly
reading of the statute the repetition of the phrase, "shall suffer death H , at
short intervals reminds him of a "minute-gun" exploding in the ears of the
assembled crew. This transformation of legal discourse into an effect of war
has a "defarniliarizing" effect, enabling White-Jacket to see through the
Articles' nonnative pretensions to the essential lawlessness of its excessive
force: "Murderous! But then, in time of peace they do not enforce these
blood-thirsty laws?" He answers this rhetorical question by alluding to the
Somers case~ and concludes with a parodic oath: "By the main-mast! then,
... I am subject to the cut-throat martial law" (p.659). Melville turns to the
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Gothic mode, embodying the law first as monster and then as a means of tor~
ture:
Afloat or wrecked the Martial lAw relaxes not its gripe [sic].
And though ... for some offence ... you were indeed to 'suffer
death,' even then the Martial Law might hunt you through the
other world. and out again at its other end ... like an endless
thread on the inevitable track ofits own point, passing unnumbered needles through (p. 661).
After this temporary plunge into the solitary dark, he turns lawyer, quoting
the rationalist prose oflegal authority against this irrational system: "may we
subscribe to the saying of Sir Matthew Hale in his History of the Common
Law, that 'the Martial Lali', being based upon no settled principles, is, in
truth and reality, no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a
law.'" A longer version of this passage from Hale, which dates from before
1676, is quoted in the Oxford English Dictionary as part of its history of the
phrase, ~'martiallaw". The quotation continues, "the Necessity of Order and
Discipline in an Army is that only which can give those Laws a
Countenance." The two elements mentioned by Hale, the lack of settled
principles and the governance of the military, were to split apart in the next
two hundred years. By the time Wellington addressed Parliament in 1851
with the words, "Martial Law was ne~ther more nor less than the will of the
general", the phrase had acquired its modem sense of the suspension of civil
law by military power. The roles governing the army and navy came to be
called "military law", a phrase which the o.E.D. finds in the Encyclopaedia
Britannica of 1883. With the development of the ideology of the rule oflaw
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the use of arbitrary force
masked as law came to be regarded as abhorrent, even in the military sphere.
Martial law was pronounced by Blackstone and subsequent writers to be contrary to English law. Despite this, it was imposed on the civilian populations
in the colonies of Ireland, India, Jamaica and South Africa at periods of crisis during the nineteenth centwy. When Melville came to write Billy Budd
the modem sense of the phrase had become accepted usage, and even those
lexicographers - like P. Austin Nuttall in Routledge's Pronouncing
Dictionary (first edition, 1863) • who retain the old sense employ the pejorative language of modem legal discourse in doing so:
Maniallaw: in military sendee, an arbitrary law. regulated by
expediency (my emphasis).
When Captain Vere describes Billy's case as one "under martial law practically to be dealt with''', and the pronouncement of sentence as "'martial law
operating through us''', he uses the older meaning, for which "Articles of
War" is a synonym.13 However, he invokes the phrase in the course of an
argument that, as we have seen, purports to adduce the binding, impersonal
authority, the "measured forms", of statute law. As a historical fiction, Billy
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Budd is able to put into dialogue the discourse of martial law current in its
era of representation and that current in its era of production. The contradictions that White-Jacket exposes through argumentation are implicit in Vere's
language when he applies modem notions of legitimacy to the "Act [that]
resembles in spirit the thing from which it derives - War" (p.388-9).
Whereas White-Jacket was able to characterize the Articles of War as a
graft from "Albion's fatal tree" which could be excised from the native
sapling of American liberty, Billy Budd leaves open the relationship between
past and present, Europe and America. Read retrospectively, the story of
Billy's death is a "tragedy ofjustice" which a true commitment to the rule of
law might have averted. Read prospectively it portends that liberty will be
sacrificed to the violent workings of a dubious "necessity" in the New World
as well as in the Old. Melville represents martial law as the vehicle of"mllitary necessity", as the "practical" or expedient considerations of maintaining the crew in a state of efficient readiness to kill or be killed take precedence over normative demands for procedural correctness, an understanding
of the nature of the crime, and an appropriate penalty. In this process of normative compromise the law is by no means an unwilling victim. The narrative records how the Lord Chief Justice judicially upholds the custom of
impressment (p.337), and the secret practice of freeing prisoners before the
expiration of their sentences to man the fleet. The civil authorities, who in
constitutional theory control the military, subvert their own legal system
whilst purporting to defend it. What the narrator calls "sanctioned irregularities" (p.344) result: breaches of the law committed by the authorities, civil
or military, in meeting the exigencies of war. When the war is prosecuted on
such a premise ofnormati~e compromise, the "necessity" of Billy's sununary execution follows a fortiori. When the agents of "sanctioned irregularities" board the Rights of Man, Melville dramatizes the transformation of
martial law from its old to its new sense, as its influence begins to extend
from the military to the civil sphere.
The pervasive operation of "sanctioned irregularities" subverts Captain
Vere's fonnalist credo. "'With mankind\ he would say, 'forms, measured
forms are everything; and this is the import couched in the story of Orpheus
with his lyre spellbinding the wild denizens ofthe woods.' And this he once
applied to the disruption offorms going on across the Channel" (pA04). This
articulation of the need for "measured fonns" follows immediately upon a
"variance from usage". The drum beat to quarters is ordered immediately
after the burial of Billy's corpse, one hour early. This is one of two commands given to quell the crew's emotional responses to Billy's death: in each
case an involuntary, collective utterance and movement signifies their common revulsion, but the expression of such pre-military humanity is checked
by the word of command: "ere the murmur had time to wax into clamour, it
was met by a strategic command, the more telling that it came with abrupt
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unexpectedness" (p.403). The men "[yield) to the mechanism of discipline"
(pA03), and the Foucauldian overtones of this formulation are more strongly heard in the narrator's meditation on the second incident: "True martial
discipline superinduces in average man a sort of impulse whose operation at
the official word of command much resembles in its promptitude the effect
of an instinct" (p.404). The discourse of "measured forms" is called forth by
incipient discontent. Discipline is maintained through forms in increased
measure, forms out oftime. The preservation oforder, like the conduct of the
war~ depends on fonns and their disruption. Consequently~ the contrast
between England and France, metonymically expressed through their flags,
"the flag of founded law and freedom defined, [and] the enemy's red meteor
of unbridled and unbounded revolt" (p.333), collapses.
"The flag of founded law and freedom defined" is a phrase of Orphic
sonority and nonnative eloquence. Much of its power lies in its use of chiasmus, the rhetorical figure of "syntactic reversal or symmetrical crossing".'4
Through its reversal of syntax, it creates a tension between its primary parallelism - the established laws and freedoms, of England - and a possible
antithesis derived from the ambiguity of the word, "defined" - established
laws and limited freedoms. Chiasmus is one of several structures of
exchange which appear throughout Billy Budd as evidence of Melville's
attempt to apprehend in narrative fonn the deceptive interplay between law
and war. The most prominent example of such a structure occurs in the narrator's reflection on the central event, the blow which strikes and kills
Claggart: "in the jugglery of circumstances ... and in the light of that martial
code whereby it was fonnally to be judged, innocence and guilt personified
in Claggart and Budd in effect changed places" (p.380). Barbara Johnson
argues that here the narrator lays bare the exchange structure of the entire
plot. IS The legal-historical review ofthe trial and of "that martial code" invited by the text operates as a kind of "reversal on appeal", casting Captain
Vere, not Billy Budd, as the "enemy within", the representative of ''justice
accused". The novella presents itself as a discursive exchange with the naval
version of Billy's story printed in the "News from the Mediterranean".
Writing cannot undo the effects of martial law. However~ Douglas Hay has
written of another naval case that, ~'law's violence disappears behind stories
of law's justice". Having traced the suppressed contradictions of Vere's invocation of martial law, we might justly reverse Hay's aphorism, and summarize Billy Budd as a story of law's injustice which exposes law's violence. 16
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